Comparative Politics Writing Assignment 1
Democracy is defined as being ill suited to
having a single definition. The complexity of this concept thereby resists
attempts made to analyze and categorize the various manifestations of the
systems that are characterized as democratic. Democracy, as a word, evokes
images of “the struggle for freedom and a better way of life.” (Schmitter)
However, as explained in article 8 of the supplemental reading, “What Democracy
is…and is not”, the conditions that must be met in order for a state to be
deemed democratic are minimal and can operate in a number of different ways
contrary to the balance of the international stage. The revolution in Egypt was
a prime example of democratic processes going awry of what the general
consensus of global players had desired. After the ousting of Hosni Mubarak
from his role as President after a near 30-year power monopoly, democratic
election put into power the Muslim Brotherhood. What this transition means for
the world remains to be seen.
Whether or not the international community
should promote democracy in authoritarian states must be answered by reflecting
on whether or not the international community is content to allow those
democracies to blossom in whatever way a given state chooses to enact their own
system. This effort of self-determination, which is a pillar of the democratic
ideology, has not always been upheld when the results of democracy are contrary
to the aspirations of fellow states. An example of this can clearly be seen in
the history of Iran. In 1951, after Mohammed Mossadegh was elected
democratically and proceeded to nationalize the oil industry of Iran, the
British government claimed this act to be a threat to the security of the
world. Eventually, Iran sought aid from the United States with Mossadegh
calling on President Truman to “remember [our] own revolution against Britain.”
On January 7, 1951, Time Magazine voted Mossadegh ‘Man of the Year’, touting
him as the Iranian George Washington. Refusing to be swayed from his
nationalization of the oil industry, Mossadegh continued to make enemies
throughout the world and the cooperation of President Truman eventually lead to
his defeat in the 1952 Presidential election in which Eisenhower claimed that
Democrats were tolerant of communist penetration.
After winning the Presidency, Eisenhower
approved a $1 million CIA budget to bring about the fall of Mossadegh. Much of
this funding went to bribing religious and military figures within Iran, as
well as merchants and the media. After a long and arduous conflict, another US
Presidential election and active protesting within Iran, British MI-6 and CIA
operatives had returned control of Iran to Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavī, who is
quoted as toasting President Roosevelt, owing his throne to God, his people,
his army, and to Roosevelt. Ultimately, Mossadegh, a democratically elected
leader, was placed in prison and then under house arrest until his death in
1967.
Democracies in foreign
sovereignties have only been supported by the United States and Great Britain
when the goals that state were in line with our own needs. Mossadegh is by no
means the first democratically elected leader to fall at the hands of
international espionage. In 1954, Jacobo Árbenz, President of the Republic of
Guatemala was ousted in a coup d'état engineered by the United States
government and the CIA. Árbenz had attempted to subvert tax dodging by the
United Food Company who were regularly undervaluing their agricultural
holdings. The Eisenhower administration once again stepped in for the favor of
big business and operation PB/Success was enacted to fabricate ties between
Guatemala and the Soviet Union, with whom we were still entrenched in the Cold
War.
The reverse is also
true; Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Rezā Shāh Pahlavī of Iran, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saddam Hussein of
Iraq are but a few of the laundry list of dictators that the United States has,
at least, supported and, at worst, played an active role in putting them into
power. Much of this support stemmed from the hyper-reactive environment created
by the hostilities of the Cold War in which many conservative leaders were
dictatorial while leaders with liberal leanings tended to identify with a
communist mentality. As such, governments that were party to the policy of
containment were more inclined to support a dictatorship that would, in turn,
support the Western effort to eradicate the threat of communism.
One has to wonder,
however, as to whether or not in our technologically connected world such
activities could transpire to the same extent as they have in the past. Part of
the reason for the success of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya and other states
is directly correlated with access to an international stage in the palm of
every hand. The advent of Facebook, Twitter and other social mediums has
increased global awareness of such human rights abuses – often to the point of
forcing the hand of international organizations to get involved. In article 10
of the supplemental reading, “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring”,
F. Gregory Gause III posits the reasons for the successes of the
revolutionaries when all attempts in the past have failed utterly. Some of
these authoritarian regimes had been in place for upwards of 40 years. Why then,
Gause asks, did these particular protests finally succeed? The key, he says,
more than any other factor, is mobilization and access. Growing pan-Arab
sentiment – the reverence of a shared culture placed above that of nationalism
– rallied surrounding states to the cause of a central voice. In many cases,
this attitude permeated throughout the military as well, dividing troops
between those who supported the current regime and those who were disenchanted
with being a tool of a ruler rather than his state.
Should the international
community promote democracy? Absolutely, it should. The caveat is whether or
not the international community seeks to pander to a newly formed democracy and
shape it to the will of a supporting sovereign or if the supporting sovereign
will uphold the rule of law that is intended to be the guiding principle of
categorizing a system as democratic in the first place. If history is any
indication of the future, then the majority of new democracies are doomed to be
democracies in name only. Currently, there are a multitude of nations that
resemble the characteristics of democracy, but fail to truly transition into
states of self-determination through rule by the people. Take, for example, the
case of Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who, in 2003, was able to utilize state
resources to invalidate petition signatures to initiate a recall against his
presidency, delaying the vote long enough for Chavez to rebuild public support
and defeat the measure initiated by the people.
Legitimacy in Egypt is struggling
due to the nature of fast tracking such transitions - without a set of rules by
which to abide, politicians cannot be chosen with the expectation of compulsory
power. However, without politicians, the rules by which the state must be
governed are in limbo as well, leaving the state in a perpetual catch-22
situation. The result of this tension is the placement of the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in a position of authority in which the consortium
is placing pressure on the interim government to “outlaw protests, stipulate
who receives outside funding and to create a constitutional stipulation making
the military the guarantor of Egyptian democracy.” (Ottaway) The slow process
towards democracy is maddening for protestors and provisional governments alike
and yet, no one can construct a government without clear rules as to how that
government should behave.
Bibliography
Gause
III, F. Gregory. "Why Middle Eastern Studies Missed the Arab Spring."
Annual Editions: Comparative Politics 12/13. Ed. Fiona Yap.
McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2012. Print.
Hague,
R., and M. Harrop. Political science: A Comparative Introduction. 5th edition.
Palgrave/MacMillan, 2008. Print.
Ottoway,
Marian. "Transitional Failure: Egypt and Tunisia." Annual
Editions: Comparative Politics 12/13. Ed. Fiona Yap. McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2012.
Print.
Schmitter,
Phillipe C.. "What Democracy Is...and Is Not." Annual Editions:
Comparative Politics 12/13. Ed. Fiona Yap. McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2012. Print.